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Abstract Aggregators are platforms that also control a 
marketplace for the suppliers’ innovations. Suppliers competing 
within aggregators are limited by the technology and governance 
rules of the platform owner. As a consequence, aggregators 
influence the type and complexity of competitive moves 
suppliers can implement. Our research investigates the drivers of 
suppliers’ competitive advantage. We incorporate existing 
literature on competitive action to identify the categories of 
moves available to suppliers. Furthermore, we identify three 
types of orthogonal moves that are unique to competition within 
aggregators. Finally, we illustrate our advanced categorization in 
the context of a major food delivery platform. Our preliminary 
results confirm that suppliers, while bounded to resources 
exposed by the aggregator, have the opportunity to implement 
an heterogenous portfolio of moves in their pursuit of 
competitive advantage. This result calls for empirical research in 
the context of competition within aggregators in general, and 
food delivery platforms specifically. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Over the last 30 years technology platforms have emerged as critical elements of all 
technological layers (e.g., operating systems, browsers) and in several application 
domains (e.g., payments, game development). Aggregators, a type of platform, are 
increasingly drawing research, media and regulatory attention. Aggregators (1) 
mediate the relationship between customers and suppliers1 by managing a 
marketplace; (2) serve customers at virtually zero marginal costs; (3) exhibit positive 
cross-side network effects. Examples include Google Search, Amazon Marketplace, 
Apple iOS, TripAdvisor, Expedia, and Deliveroo. Aggregators rise to prominence 
by creating superior value for customers. Consider Google Search and the 
aggregation of demand for online information seeking. As the number of Web pages 
increased exponentially, the precision of the Google’s page-rank algorithm enabled 
the firm to provide better answers to customer search queries. Google became the 
de-facto organizer of information on the Web, a valuable service for customers. 
Whether it is the search for information, the procurement of travel, or the ordering 
of food, aggregators come to own customer relationships by providing a superior 
solution to a customer “job to be done” (Ulwick 2002). 
 
The competitive performance of aggregators have received significant attention (see 
for a review: Mcintyre and Srinivasan 2017; de Reuver et al. 2018).  However, we 
have yet to fully understand how suppliers can successfully compete within 
aggregators, given the idiosyncrasies they present. First, aggregators create synthetic 
algorithmic marketplaces that are not bounded by the limitations of the physical 
world. Being algorithmic, the competitive rules within aggregators can evolve 
arbitrarily and unpredictably. Second, aggregators mediate the interaction between 
suppliers and their customers. Unlike the traditional supply-retail relationship, 
aggregators (e.g., Expedia) intermediate the relationship between suppliers (e.g., 
hotels) and their customers (e.g., travelers). Because of this characteristic, they are a 
special case of platforms (see below), in which suppliers are limited by the 
competitive moves afforded by the aggregators. Third, the algorithmic mediation 
and the matching mechanisms implemented by aggregators exert pressure toward 
the commoditization of suppliers. Having to comply with the aggregators’ 
technological prerequisites and governance rules, while being unable to own the 
                                                     
1 Suppliers as those organizations that leverage the platform resources to produce digital innovations (i.e., new 
market offerings, business processes, or models). 
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transactional relationship with their customers creates obstacles to competitive 
differentiation by suppliers. 
 
We offer three contributions to the literature. First, we advance a conceptualization 
of aggregators as a special type of platforms. Second, we identify the classes of 
competitive actions that suppliers can deploy when competing within aggregators, 
introducing the notion of platform moves, marketplace moves and outside moves. 
Finally, we illustrate the above categorization in the context of digital food delivery 
aggregators. The work is important because the vast majority of constituencies for 
our research are suppliers and, as aggregators gain prominence, these firms must 
find ways to compete within their synthetic algorithmic marketplaces. 
 
2 Definitions 
 
2.1 Platforms 
 
We adopt an information systems perspective, defining platforms as a socio-
technical systems with a layered architecture that facilitates digital innovation by 
suppliers through the exposure of digital resources (Parker et al. 2017; Rodriguez 
and Piccoli 2020). Digital innovation is “the creation of market offerings, business 
processes, or models that result from the use of digital technology.” (Nambisan et 
al. 2017, p. 224) Platforms are structurally different from traditional applications 
because they provide generic resources that heterogeneous supplier communities 
can leverage and combine to produce their digital innovations (Gawer 2014; Hanseth 
and Lyytinen 2010). The degree to which a platform enables digital innovation is a 
function of its “generativity” (Zittrain 2005). We observe different levels of 
generativity as platforms can diverge in the breath of possible uses, and in the degree 
to which they facilitate the achievement of desirable objectives. Consider the 
example of the Windows .NET software development platform. .NET facilitates the 
development of a broad range of software applications. However, due to its general 
design, .NET requires significant efforts to develop complex applications in specific 
domains (e.g., games). On the other hand, the Unity game development platform 
facilitates the achievement of highly complex, yet narrow, objectives that would be 
hard to realize by independent game developers using general software development 
platforms. 
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2.2 Marketplaces 
 
Economist commonly refer to the entity that facilitates the transaction in two-sided 
or multi-sided markets as the platform sponsor or owner (Eisenmann et al. 2009). 
Much previous research uses the terms market, marketplace, and platform 
interchangeably. The concepts are related, but distinct. A market is a specified 
category of potential buyers, like readers in the market for books. A marketplace 
(e.g., the Amazon Marketplace) is the space, increasingly digital, where people meet 
for the purpose of trade. It facilitates the exchange of products, services, and 
information between buyers and sellers (Pavlou and Gefen 2004).  
 
The recent success of the AppStore and Google Play demonstrates how ownership 
of a marketplace can be a source of competitive advantage for platform owners. 
However, it is not a defining prerequisite for a platform to own a marketplace. 
Windows, the first dominant software platform, did not integrate a marketplace and 
suppliers were free to distribute their innovation (software applications) 
independently – some chose OEM partnerships, some retailers, some used mail 
order or, after the commercialization of the Internet, direct downloads. Marketplaces 
differ in the degree of control exerted by the owner. In some cases, like Apple, the 
DRM module in the iOS kernel guarantees full control over the distribution channel 
of apps through the AppStore (unless the device is jailbroken). In others, like 
Android, the same platform may host multiple competing marketplaces for the 
suppliers’ digital innovations (Karhu et al. 2018).  
 
Marketplace owners determine the technological prerequisites and governance rules 
for participation (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2015). Where marketplace 
participants can adopt opportunistic behaviors, the owner also functions as an 
enabler of trust by protecting customers (e.g., by granting favorable refund policies) 
or reducing information asymmetry (e.g., by implementing rating systems) (Pavlou 
and Gefen 2004). Finally, through the implementation of discovery features, such as 
search functionalities, filtering functionalities, and recommendation systems, 
marketplace owners impact the value capture potential of all parties (Li et al. 2018). 
  
Joaquin Rodriguez and Gabriele Piccoli: 
Competing within Aggregators: Competitive Moves in the Deliveroo Online Delivery Platform 339 
 
 
2.3 Aggregators 
 
An aggregator is a type of platform that integrates a marketplace. It facilitates digital 
innovations (like platforms) and transactions between suppliers and customers (like 
marketplaces). Aggregators have three defining characteristics: First, they mediate 
the relationship between customers (e.g., consumers) and sellers (i.e., suppliers) via 
synthetic algorithmic marketplaces. Suppliers are incentivized or required to 
distribute their innovation in the aggregator’s own marketplace. 
 
Second, aggregators can serve customers at virtually zero marginal costs. 
Aggregators standardize interactions between customers and suppliers, thereby 
reducing the complexity, and cost, of managing transactions. For example, the 
ordering and fulfillment process in a food delivery aggregator is standardized for all 
participating restaurants. Membership in the aggregator’s platform and marketplace 
implies respect of technological prerequisites and governance rules by suppliers, 
rules that are typically algorithmically enforced. This process of adjustment is 
inherently commoditizing, as it leads to an increase in the comparability of suppliers, 
and a reduction in the options they have for differentiating their offer. 
 
Third, aggregators exhibit positive cross-side network effects (Katz and Shapiro 
1994) because their value creation potential depends on aggregating demand on the 
customer side and aggregating a range of suppliers on the supply side. Such network 
effects often engender winner-take-all dynamics leading successful aggregators to 
command monopolistic positions that force suppliers to join. 
 
3 Competing in Aggregators 
 
The premise of this study is that the emergence of aggregators significantly 
influences the competitive actions available to suppliers. Unlike traditional 
marketplaces, organizations that participate in aggregators are impacted by digital 
technology in two ways. First, they are limited in the extent to which they can 
innovate by the degree of generativity of the platform they chose. Second, they are 
bound by the algorithmically enforced marketplace governance rules. It is within 
these limitations that suppliers craft their competitive actions. 
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3.1 Competitive Actions 
 
Organizations compete by a series of actions designed to recombine resources in the 
pursuit of improved performance (Henfridsson et al. 2018). A competitive action is 
“any externally oriented, specific, observable competitive move initiated by a firm to 
enhance its relative competitive position” (Smith et al. 2001, p. 12). In the IS 
tradition, competitive actions are enacted through initiatives that depend on the use 
of digital technologies at their core (Piccoli and Ives 2005). Previous studies have 
grouped competitive actions into pricing, marketing/promotional, product, product 
presentation, payment, capacity/scale, service, and operations moves (Ferrier et al. 
1999; Li et al. 2019; Yu and Cannella Jr 2007). These studies assume that the 
competitive environment complexity and dynamics are general features of the 
industry. However, when firms compete within aggregators, they are subject to the 
idiosyncratic dynamics explicitly determined by the aggregator (Kapoor and Agarwal 
2017). Therefore, suppliers that participate in an aggregator can be subject to 
different competitive dynamics with respect to that of the industry. To account for 
this specificity, we add an orthogonal set of three classes of competitive action types 
that are unique to competition within aggregators: platform actions, marketplace 
actions and outside actions. 
 
− Platform actions are moves the suppliers enact to create their digital 
innovation by leveraging the generic digital resources exposed by the 
platform (Henfridsson et al. 2018). More generative platforms afford higher 
optionality, and thus provide the suppliers with a wider array of competitive 
actions. When exploiting platform actions, suppliers seek to create synergy 
between their innovation and the platform in order to improve their 
competitive advantage versus other suppliers (Cennamo et al. 2018; Tiwana 
2018). 
− Marketplace actions are moves the suppliers enact to improve their visibility 
by influencing the filtering, search, and/or the algorithmic dynamics created 
by the aggregator. As aggregators scale, and competition between suppliers 
increases, it becomes of critical importance for suppliers to achieve superior 
visibility in the marketplace. As customers face high search costs when 
browsing through a larger number of supplier offerings, superior visibility 
offers a competitive advantage by improving the probability that customers 
will find and transact with a supplier (Carare 2012; Li et al. 2018). 
Furthermore, visibility is particularly important in aggregators, as most 
exhibit a Pareto distribution, where a small number of suppliers capture the 
majority of transactions (Garg and Telang 2013). 
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− Outside actions are competitive moves the suppliers enact independently of 
the aggregator’s platform resources. They do not leverage any platform or 
marketplace functionalities. Outside actions can lead to significant 
competitive advantage, as they offer suppliers the opportunity to implement 
moves with high degree of differentiation potential. Outside actions 
therefore tend to depend on the general ecosystem and industry conditions, 
instead of the characteristics of the aggregator. However, outside actions 
are not insulated from the aggregator’s influence, exerted through 
contractual or algorithmically enforced governance and technical rules. For 
example, until 2015, Booking.com prevented hoteliers to offer lower prices 
in competing distribution channels, including the hotel’s own website. To 
limit fraud, Amazon’s algorithms trigger account reviews when a seller 
experience sudden increases in the number and dollar amount of their 
monthly transactions. As a side effect, such triggers limit the use and 
effectiveness of aggressive marketing campaign outside of the Amazon 
marketplace. 
 
Digital food delivery platforms are emerging examples of aggregators, where 
competition between and within aggregators is evolving rapidly. In the remainder of 
this paper we use the case of the dominant European player to demonstrate and 
categorize competitive actions by suppliers (i.e., restaurants). 
 
4 The Case of Deliveroo 
 
Founded in London in 2013, Deliveroo facilitates the implementation of food 
delivery by restaurants that would otherwise lack such service. The firm rapid growth 
has positioned it as one of the major food delivery aggregators in Europe. With more 
than 5,000 employees it generated over $300 millions in revenue in 2019. The 
Deliveroo platform exposes a number of digital resources enabling restaurants’ 
delivery services. Examples include menu configuration tools, order and payment 
acceptance, and a large network of riders. These resources are accessible to suppliers 
via a dashboard or through a set of APIs that can integrate with restaurants existing 
Point of Sale systems (POS). Deliveroo is an aggregator, because its platform 
integrates a marketplace where diners (customers) can browse through all the 
restaurant offerings (suppliers). In the UK the number of restaurants delivering to 
any given location varies between ten and 800. Thus, where the number of 
restaurants is significant, discovery becomes critical to guarantee relevance. 
Deliveroo offers filters and search functionalities to navigate through available 
offerings. Moreover, it implements an algorithmic recommendation system that 
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ranks restaurants in real-time depending on the probability that customers will place 
an order to each restaurant. 
 
4.1 Methods 
 
We selected the case based on two criteria. First, the emergence of food delivery 
platforms has intensified competition and disrupted long established competitive 
dynamics in the restaurant industry. Second, Deliveroo is at the forefront of 
technological innovation in the establishment of advanced platform resources (e.g., 
restaurant partner API), and sophisticated algorithmic marketplace dynamics 
governance rules (e.g., predictive restaurant ranking). We followed an iterative 
approach for categorizing the competitive actions restaurants can enact in 
Deliveroo. The list is compiled based on unstructured interviews with restaurateurs, 
the authors’ analysis of Deliveroo’s technology, and from public sources, such as 
media reports and Deliveroo’s documentation. Each competitive action identified 
was individually coded by the two authors into one action category and type. Action 
categories are identified from previous competitive dynamic literature, while actions 
types are our proposed orthogonal classification. In case of disagreements, the 
coders discussed the coding until 100 percent agreement was achieved.  
 
4.2 Case Findings 
 
We identified 24 competitive actions (see Table 1) that restaurants can implement 
for improving their performance within the aggregator. Our exploratory case 
analysis provides interesting findings. First, our categorization shows how the 
majority of platform-based actions available to suppliers in food delivery aggregators 
(15/24) are designed to facilitate the commercialization of the restaurant’s already 
existing offerings, through product presentation, service, and marketing moves. The 
aggregator affords only two actions in the product category, that simply include the 
introduction or removal of a new menu items or their modifiers. Therefore, given 
the available menu items, restaurants can differentiate their offerings by curating the 
presentation of the items or by improving their service levels (e.g., low delivery 
times).  
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Second, the vast majority of actions we identified are platform-based (16/24). 
Despite the strategic importance of visibility and discoverability in the Deliveroo 
marketplace, restaurants only have limited functionalities available to directly impact 
them. Instead, the visibility is indirectly determined by a combination of platform-
based (e.g., percentage of menu items with images) and outside actions (e.g., delivery 
times), and is determined algorithmically by Deliveroo. Therefore, superior visibility 
can only be achieved by those restaurants that recognize the importance and pursue 
the implementation of those indirect factors that influence their visibility.  
 
Finally, we find that Deliveroo does not facilitate the implementation of competitive 
moves in all categories. Although this is not unexpected, we find that restaurants can 
circumvent this limitation by implementing outside moves in the capability and 
scale/operations categories. However, for the payment’s category, Deliveroo 
inhibits the implementation of any competitive actions by fully controlling the 
payment process. Furthermore, the absence of any platform-based action in the 
capacity and scale categories indicates a well-defined separation between the 
restaurants’ internal operations and the aggregator. 
 
5 Discussion 
 
Our analysis of Deliveroo shows that to compete within aggregators, suppliers 
deploy a range of competitive moves aimed at performance improvements. As a 
consequence, different competitive move configurations can account for 
heterogeneous organizational performances. In particular, our orthogonal 
classification of competitive actions offers a new viewpoint for analyzing the 
strategic potential and effects of competitive actions in the context of aggregators.  
As competitive moves exhibit varying levels of complexity, suppliers can implement 
barriers aimed at preempting imitation.  
 
Our analysis suggests that the products or service characteristics might influence the 
type of competitive actions available to suppliers competing within aggregators. For 
example, when the product is digital rather than physical, it is easier for aggregators 
to facilitate the development of new products at scale. Instead, when the product is 
physical (e.g., a household appliance), the aggregator might focus on facilitating 
product presentation or service action categories. However, through the process of 
“infrastructuring” (Constantinides et al. 2018), aggregators can extend their reach 
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and scope into the physical domain. Deliveroo recently started experimenting with 
“cloud kitchens,” by allowing restaurants to increase their capacity and scale by 
renting delivery-only optimized kitchens to them. 
 
The increasing control of the marketplace visibility by recommender systems 
demands the development of new dynamic capabilities by suppliers. Achieving a 
visibility advantage requires continuous sensing and adaptation by suppliers, as the 
aggregators’ algorithms are often proprietary and constantly evolving. For example, 
Deliveroo recently started promoting those restaurants that use recyclable packaging 
materials. Quickly adjusting to this requirement with the appropriate outside moves, 
improves a supplier’s visibility. Furthermore, when direct (e.g., ads) and indirect 
actions (e.g., time of delivery) for impacting visibility are available, suppliers need to 
optimize their combination to achieve maximum visibility. 
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Table 1: Competitive actions available in Deliveroo 
 
Category Competitive Action Type 
Product: Launch new products 
or modify existing ones. 
 
Add or remove a new menu item. Platform 
Add or remove modifiers for an item (e.g., 
remove/add ingredient). 
Platform 
Change food packaging to improve quality. Outside 
Price: Implement price cuts and 
sales incentives. 
 
Change the price of a menu item/modifier. Platform 
Launch discount, meal deals, or bundles. Marketplac
e 
Product presentation: Improve 
the product information 
provided to customers. 
Add/change a menu item description. Platform 
Add/change a menu item image. Platform 
Change the items order in the menu. Platform 
Add/modify the menu categories (e.g., starters, 
mains). 
Platform 
Service: Change the company’s 
range or level of services 
provided to customers. 
 
Change the opening hours on the delivery 
platform. 
Platform 
Receive reservations (pre-orders) outside the 
restaurants’ opening times. 
Platform 
Set the delivery times (only for restaurant that 
manage their own fleet). 
Platform 
Activate “busy mode” to increase the normal 
delivery times. 
Platform 
Turn-off the delivery service. Platform 
Mark menu items as unavailable. Platform 
Decrease/increase delivery times. Outside 
Service/Operations Manage own delivery riders’ fleet. Platform 
Marketing: Perform advertising 
and promotions activities. 
Add/change food category items used as filters 
to discover the restaurant. 
Marketplac
e 
Create a brand page on the delivery platform. Platform 
Launch a virtual brand, that exists only on the 
delivery platform. 
Platform 
Launch promotions increasing traffic to the 
delivery platform. 
Outside 
Capacity and Scale: Change the 
company’s capacity or output. 
Open a “dark kitchen,” optimized for delivery, 
and that has no access to the public. 
Outside 
Capacity and Scale/Operations: 
Change in organizational 
activity systems 
Increase the kitchen capacity, and/or assign 
dedicated staff members to fulfill delivery order. 
Outside 
Dedicate front-end staff to manage relationship 
with delivery riders. 
Outside 
Payment: Provide customers 
with multiple payment options 
None.  
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6 Limitations and future research 
 
Supplier’s appropriation of value within aggregators presents many idiosyncrasies 
that warrant future research attention to fill gaps in our understanding of 
competition in increasingly digital markets. We contribute to the body of knowledge 
on platforms and marketplaces by identifying three different types of competitive 
actions that suppliers can implement when competing within aggregators. However, 
our initial findings require the analysis of multiple aggregators within and across 
different industries before the external validity of our categorization is established. 
Future research should use our initial categorization to empirically investigate those 
competitive configurations that lead to superior performance of suppliers competing 
within aggregators. The identification of the three different types of competitive 
actions (i.e., platform, marketplace, outside) demands empirical investigations to 
determine possible differences in their relative effectiveness for short and long-term 
competitive position. Finally, the investigation of visibility as a source of competitive 
advantage has yet to receive significant attention and focused empirical attention in 
this area is needed. 
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